

with Polaris, up in New London because it was, at that time, they called it the rear-echelon of Squadron 14, which was in Holy Loch. We had all of the training, the rehabilitation, the restructuring of the crews and taking care of the crews and all of their multiple personnel problems, which they all had, and the training facility and the home-porting of where the dependents were, all taken care of in the rear-echelon which was then absorbed, while I was chief of staff, into the staff proper, so we took it on.

Q: That wasn't what I was referring to, however; I was referring to the missile crisis which came up shortly after you went there.

V. Adm. B.: You meant the Cuban crisis.

Q: The Cuban crisis. That was in October of 1962, it was developing in August.

V. Adm. B.: That's right, that's right, exactly. That was very interesting, from our perspective, the things that we did on the staff and that we recommended be done, because when the Cuban missile crisis came we had a number of SSBNs in Holy Loch. Of course, the tender was also a very important factor in all of this. We on the staff felt that we ought to get every submarine out of there as quickly as we could, and we recommended this and said we felt that they could get out in 48 hours. Everything could be out of there including the tender. The answer that we got from some of the staff people in Norfolk was, well, why do

you worry about the tender? Our feeling up there was: (a) we want to darn well protect it, but, (b) it has a lot more of an impact that the support is going to--it is going to sea, also.

Q: It's the mother ship.

V. Adm. B.: It's the mother ship and what does this all mean? It was bound to cause people to stop and think, and pause and take a long thought about what was the implication of this--to give them one more thing to consider back in the Kremlin. According to Time magazine they quoted Khrushchev as saying that Polaris was one of the main considerations in his pulling back in the Cuban crisis. This was a quote that I saw in Time magazine. Do you remember that?

Q: I don't remember that, no.

V. Adm. B.: He said it was a major --the Polaris program, the fact that they had Polaris missiles at sea close to his homeland gave him a lot of pause for thought. That was attributed to him. Whether it was right or wrong, I don't know. But, we did, we pulled the stops on the staff, and of course, in the support factor that tender was our responsibility. When the ships were alongside the tender, it was our concern to get them out to sea ready to do their job. They were remarkably put together. The first snip went out almost immediately and the second one went out within 24 hours and then there was a third one alongside and she went out like 36 hours later, followed by

the tender, which was really a remarkable achievement on the part of all hands over there in the Holy Loch, the staff and all the workers on the tender and ships themselves. It had a tremendous impact on us up and down the coast too, but I mean getting those submarines to sea was a real critical item. So, we had the maximum number that we could get to sea at sea at the time of the crisis.

Q: Were they incidentally directed from the White House?

V. Adm. B.: Yes, except that the movement of ships, naval ships, you can do a lot of things in international waters without having to request permission to do it. Today that isn't quite the case, but still we do move ships, Commanders in Chiefs, move ships at sea towards troubled areas, awaiting instructions, or else requesting instructions. You have that mobility of getting your force en route, getting going because it's not offensive, it's not visible, it's not offensive, it can't be construed as anything other than a normal, prudent precaution. You know, as long as you don't intrude into territorial waters or are too visible or too obvious. I guess I shouldn't use the word too obvious. I mean who knows what an intent is anyhow in the mind of any one individual, but certainly we protect ourselves every time we can to move our forces at sea towards troubled areas. Then, of course, the White House on down gives us instructions about what we can and cannot do.

But, in this case, we moved the ships out of the Holy Loch as a precaution without having the orders from above. We advised

them that we were doing this immediately.

Q: This was protective rather than offensive.

V. Adm. B.: That's right. It was a protective measure but it had a very salutary effect. Of course, it was immediately endorsed, embraced, there was no argumentation and moving the tender out was strictly something that we thought, as I say, on the staff level and in between the two staffs. But, it too was endorsed, but really we can move those ships without having to go to anybody for permission.

As Chief of Staff up in New London, I had a particular interest from my prior tour of duty on that staff in Submarine Development Group 2 matters and have always had a great deal of interest in it. Now, that grew out of Project Kayo, Kayo being knockout, just what you might think of as knocking out enemy submarines. It was the beginning of the submarine formally in anti-submarine warfare and it stemmed back to immediately after the World War II period. But Project Kayo, when it was originally structured, was structured for various phases of development, and going from material developments in order to equip a submarine so that they could better wage ASW and then gradually into the tactical development and evaluation, tactical development primarily, and evaluation subsequently. It was phased over four or five phases of, you know, over a period of many years. It was supposed to be staggered that way.

Well, we got hung up, I say we, editorially, Submarine